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Bankruptcy Rates among NFL Players 
with Short-Lived Income Spikes†
By Kyle Carlson, Joshua Kim, Annamaria Lusardi, and Colin F. Camerer*
One of the central predictions of the  life‑cycle 
hypothesis is that individuals smooth con‑
sumption over their economic life cycle; thus, 
they save when income is high to provide for 
when income is likely to be low, such as after 
retirement.
We test for consumption smoothing in a 
group of people whose income profile does not 
just gradually rise then fall, as it does for most 
workers, but rather has a very large spike last‑
ing only a few years. These people are play‑
ers in the National Football League (NFL). A 
career lasting six years (the median length) will 
provide an NFL player with more earnings than 
an average college graduate will get in an entire 
lifetime, plus a modest pension (Figure 1). 
However, earnings are risky because an injury 
can cut a player’s career short. Even healthy 
players’ careers usually end by their mid‑30s. 
Players’ typical post‑retirement income is 
much lower than the income they earn while 
playing, and NFL retirement benefits are mod‑
est (Weir, Jackson, and Sonnega 2009). These 
features of income level and uncertainty are 
presumably known to players. To maintain a 
smooth level of consumption after the predict‑
able post‑NFL income drop, a rational, patient 
player should therefore save a large portion of 
his NFL earnings and enter retirement with a 
high net worth.
It is difficult to measure the ups and downs 
of the consumption and wealth of NFL players. 
Therefore, to test whether NFL players have 
adequate savings we measure how many retired 
NFL players file for bankruptcy.
In simulations not reported here, benchmark 
forecasts of optimally‑saving individuals with 
income spikes, calibrated to what the NFL play‑
ers actually earn, yield essentially no simulated 
bankruptcies (based on Livshits, MacGee, and 
Tertilt 2007). However, NFL players may not 
save enough because of optimism about career 
length, poor financial decisions, or social pres‑
sures to spend (factors we will consider in ongo‑
ing work).
Indeed, we find that initial bankruptcy filings 
begin to occur very soon after retirement and 
continue at a substantial rate through at least the 
first 12 years of retirement.
I. Data Sources
We collected data on all players drafted by 
NFL teams from 1996 to 2003 ( N = 2,016).1 
NFL players are public figures so information 
about them is available from many sources. 
We used pro‑football‑reference.com and NFL.
com to obtain basic information, including full 
name, career length, date of birth, hometown, 
and college. Annual NFL salary information 
was sourced from USAToday.com and Spotrac.
com. Salary data is only available starting in the 
year 2000, so career earnings could only be cal‑
culated for players whose entire careers began 
and ended between 2000 and 2013. There were 
1 In the annual draft, teams sequentially pick rookie play‑
ers. However, a total of 134 of the draftees did not play in 
the NFL. They are omitted from most analyses but including 
them as retired players makes little difference. Another 79 
players played to the 2013 season or later; their retirement 
periods did not overlap with our bankruptcy data. They are 
still included in our analyses whenever possible. 
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928 such players and 892 of them had earnings 
data available. To check the quality of the sal‑
ary data we regressed  log career earnings on 
career length interacted with draft round dummy 
variables. The regression has an  R 2 of 0.83 
and the expected coefficients on all variables. 
Bankruptcy court documents are public infor‑
mation, so we used a commercial background 
check service to search for filings by the players. 
Individuals were matched to bankruptcy records 
by full name and address. Matches were care‑
fully inspected to rule out false positives.
The performance of the matching process is 
good; for example, we find very few filings by 
individuals while they are still playing, but many 
filings among the retired.
II. Bankruptcies
We describe bankruptcies in terms of the 
annual hazard rate of the time to the first bank‑
ruptcy filing. Very few players file for bank‑
ruptcy before retirement, which makes a survival 
analysis focusing on retirement appropriate.2 
This approach also deals well with the varying 
lengths of different players’ retirement periods. 
2 We estimate discrete‑time hazard functions using linear 
probability models. These regressions use data where each 
player contributes one observation for each month from the 
time he starts playing until he files for bankruptcy or reaches 
the end of the time period when we have data available. The 
outcome is one in the last month if bankruptcy is filed and 
zero otherwise. A player’s retirement period is defined as 
starting in January of year  y + 1 if his final NFL season was 
in year  y . 
The sample is censored after 2013 due to data 
availability.
In Figure 2, bankruptcy hazard rates and 
median career earnings are shown for each career 
length bin. Each player’s total career earnings 
are plotted with jitter. The median level of earn‑
ings across all players is about $3.2 million (in 
year 2000 dollars). The figure shows that play‑
ers with longer careers have much greater earn‑
ings and opportunity to save for retirement, yet 
their bankruptcy hazard during retirement is no 
lower than those with shorter careers and lower 
earnings (the hazard rate is roughly constant). 
Among individuals who played at least one sea‑
son, the average annual hazard rate during retire‑
ment (with standard error) is  0.0119 ± 0.0009 . 
These rates are remarkably flat across career 
lengths, except for a pronounced spike for play‑
ers who played exactly 5 years (one year beyond 
the typical 4‑year rookie contract). This spike 
will be investigated in future research.
Table 1 shows estimates of bankruptcy hazard 
functions. Each row of the table corresponds to a 
separate regression, including a different “career 
variable” measure and a common “being retired” 
0–1 dummy in each regression. The last column 
shows that the estimated effect of being retired 
is to increase the annual hazard rate by about 
0.01123 in model (1), and is similarly close to 
0.01 in all specifications. Essentially, retirement 
raises the risk of bankruptcy from nearly zero 
to a substantial level. These estimates are robust 
to the inclusion of additional variables that are 
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Figure 2. Bankruptcy Hazard Rates by Career Length
Source: Authors’ calculations (see text for details).
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expected to affect bankruptcy risk. The “career 
variable” column in Table 1 shows the estimated 
effects of the variables listed in the second col‑
umn of the table. These variables are interacted 
with a retirement dummy variable in order to 
isolate the retirement period, where almost all 
bankruptcies occur.
There are no significant effects of career earn‑
ings or career length on the bankruptcy hazard 
rate. An additional $1 million in career earn‑
ings is estimated to reduce the hazard rate by 
only  0.000034 ± 0.000183 . Small, insignificant 
effects are also found for all other career vari‑
ables listed in column 2.
These earnings models include only half the 
sample because of limits on salary data avail‑
ability. However, the full sample is used in a 
regression where career length serves as a proxy 
for career earnings (row 2). Each additional 
year in the NFL is estimated to decrease bank‑
ruptcy hazard during retirement by a minuscule 
0.00017 ± 0.00027 .
We note that increased career earnings do 
reduce bankruptcy very early in retirement, but 
the effect is quite small. (In all post‑retirement 
spans longer than two years, there is no signif‑
icant effect of higher earnings on bankruptcy 
hazard.) In the two‑years‑only model an extra 
$1 million in earnings decreases the bank‑
ruptcy hazard rate by  0.000305 ± 0.000125 . 
To put this effect in context, note that in the same 
 two‑years‑only model retirement increases the 
hazard rate by  0.00867 . Therefore, reducing the 
effect of retirement by one‑half would require 
about $14 million in additional career earnings, 
which is roughly 12 times the average lifetime 
earnings of a high school graduate (Day and 
Newburger 2002).
Figure 3 shows the portion of players that 
have filed for bankruptcy by each year of retire‑
ment. The plot is nearly flat at zero during the 
three years before retirement, which confirms 
the previous finding that the hazard rate while 
playing is very small. (Active players don’t go 
bankrupt.) At the beginning of retirement, the 
plot indicates an increasing hazard rate.
Using regression results not displayed here, 
we confirmed that the hazard rate increases over 
the course of the first two years of retirement. 
This gradual increase is likely due to a combi‑
nation of players rapidly drawing down limited 
savings and having leveraged investments. In 
addition, some players continue to play profes‑
sionally in another league. Football salaries are 
much lower outside the NFL, but these additional 
earnings might help players to avoid bankruptcy 
immediately after retirement. The hazard rate 
picks up as players move into retirement, and 
the bankruptcy proportion increases steadily up 
to 15.7 percent at 12 years of retirement. Beyond 
12 years the estimates lose precision rapidly due 
to censoring because of the span of our sample.
Table 1—Effects of Career Length, Earnings, and 
Retirement on the Bankruptcy Hazard Rate
Effect of . . . 
Model #
Career variable
in the model
Career 
variable
Being 
retired
(1) None 1.123 ***
(0.092)
(2) Career length −0.017 1.200 ***
(0.027) (0.155)
(3) Career earnings −0.003 1.090 ***
(0.018) (0.164)
(4) log earnings  0.075 1.052 ***
(0.090)  (0.145)
(5) Quad. earnings 0.012 1.057 ***
(0.034)  (0.175)
(6) Draft round 0.042 0.939 ***
(0.047) (0.219)
Notes: Estimates are effects on the annual hazard rate mul‑
tiplied by 100. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered 
by individual. The quadratic earnings effect is the average 
marginal effect.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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The result of our comprehensive research on 
bankruptcy risk among NFL players is quite 
different from a widely‑cited Sports Illustrated 
article, which reported that 78 percent of former 
NFL players are bankrupt or under “financial 
stress” within two years of retirement (Torre 
2009). After two years of retirement, only about 
1.9 percent of players in our sample have filed 
for bankruptcy.
The regression analyses can be used to extrap‑
olate the possible evolution of the bankruptcy 
rate later in retirement. Two prediction bounds 
result from estimating individual hazard rates 
for each year of retirement (e.g., a ninth‑year 
rate, an eleventh‑year rate, and so on). The min‑
imum predicted hazard rate  λ min is the lowest of 
these estimated annual rates minus two standard 
errors. The rate  λ max is the largest estimate plus 
two standard errors. The prediction  λ t is based 
on a regression that fits the annual hazard rate 
to a quadratic trend (allowing cumulative bank‑
ruptcy to level off). These results show that a 
very pessimistic prediction gives a bankruptcy 
rate of around 40 percent. However, even in the 
most conservative scenario, nearly 15 percent 
of players will have declared bankruptcy by 25 
years after retirement.
III. Bankruptcy in the NFL  
and the General Population
Bankruptcy in the NFL sample can be com‑
pared to the general population in two ways. 
First, Sullivan, Thorne, and Warren (2001) use 
court records from 2001 to estimate simple bank‑
ruptcy filing rates. Their rates in the under 25 and 
25–34 age groups are 0.0035 and 0.0117, respec‑
tively; the latter rate is close to the overall hazard 
rate of 0.0119 in the NFL sample even though 
their population’s income is undoubtedly much 
lower. Second, the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth 1997 (NLSY) covers much of the same 
time period as our sample. Among NLSY men 
in the same age cohorts as the NFL sample, the 
hazard rate (from self‑reported bankruptcy) is 
0.0038 ± 0.0005 , which is much lower than the 
NFL players’ rate. More analysis will be done in 
future work to provide sharper comparisons.
IV. Conclusion
The traditional life‑cycle model of savings is 
put to an extreme test when workers earn a large 
amount of their lifetime income in a short burst 
which ends randomly. Players drafted by NFL 
teams from 1996 to 2003 are in exactly this sit‑
uation. Players with median‑length careers earn 
about $3.2 million in a few years. If they are 
forward‑looking and patient, they should save 
a large fraction of their income to provide for 
when they retire from the NFL.
Our findings are different from what the 
life‑cycle model predicts. First, players declare 
bankruptcy relatively soon after retirement. 
After only two years post‑retirement many play‑
ers have gone into bankruptcy. Second, annual 
bankruptcy (“hazard”) rates are not affected 
by a player’s total earnings or career length. 
Having played for a long time and having been 
a successful and well‑paid player does not pro‑
vide much protection against the risk of going 
bankrupt.
Future work will focus on what types of play‑
ers have higher bankruptcy risk, perhaps indicat‑
ing behavioral biases, correlates of predictably 
poor financial decision‑making, and social vari‑
ables. This evidence should also inform helpful 
interventions, both for these athletes and for 
other workers with unusual income profiles.
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